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A B S T R A C T
January 2015 witnessed an important step towards further integration in Eurasia, with the
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) coming into operation. It comprises three members of
the former Eurasian Customs Union (CU), Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, plus Kyrgyzstan
and Armenia.
Recent debates on Eurasian integration consider the EAEU to be a Russian hegemonic
project in the region. However, the potential of this project is yet to be discovered. This
article has pioneered in applying the neo-Gramscian approach to analysing the potential
for the EAEU as a Russian counter-hegemonic initiative. The neo-Gramscian understand-
ing of hegemony, which constitutes of four core elements, is reﬂected in the structure of
the article: the institutional design, material capabilities (the capitalist system), security
invulnerability (geopolitics) and cultural leadership.
The article concludes that Russian regional hegemony has not yet been formed, but has
the potential to be completed. Hegemony has been consolidated domestically, and has started
outward expansion through the EAEU as its institutional mechanism. However, to succeed
with its hegemonic project, the Russian government should not simply copy the EU’s in-
stitutional design but learn how to present the achievements of integration as successful
efforts at creating a strong welfare system that favours key social groups in order to obtain
social consent and take cultural leadership.
The novelty of the presentation of hegemony as an evolutionary process, which passes
through initial, transitional and conclusive phases of its development, along with the re-
centness of the EAEU as a topic, could make this article a contribution to Eurasian integration
studies.
Copyright © 2016 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
In 2007, Russia, Kazakhstan andBelarus declared their in-
tention to create a customs union within the Eurasian
Economic community – the Eurasian Customs Union (CU).
In contrast to the manifold previous attempts at integration
in the post-Soviet space, this initiative happened to be a fast-
movingproject thatmanagedtomakesuﬃcientpractical steps,
such as the introduction of the common customs tariff, the
adoption of the Customs Code in 2010, and the elimination
of border controls in 2011. January 2015 witnessed an im-
portant step towards further integration of the CUmembers,
with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) coming into op-
eration, with Kyrgyzstan and Armenia joining as new
members.
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The actuality of Eurasian integration studies is dictated
by the attention paid by politicians and academia to the
Russian Federation’s policy in the “Near Abroad”,
characterised as focused on achieving Russian regional he-
gemony (Saivetz, Shevtsova, Tsygankov, Trenin, Van Herpen).
The EAEU’s signiﬁcance as a case study for this article stems
from questions about what caused the recent CU to succeed
where its predecessors failed, and why now, but not before,
the EAEU could become an eﬃcient tool for recapturing and
preserving Russian dominance in the region.
This article argues that the current historical moment
could be favourable for the EAEU to form part of the Russian
hegemonic project. The main research question pertains to
how successful the EAEU is as a tool of Russian regional he-
gemony. This main topic implies the challenge of deﬁning
the notion of hegemony. It is suggested that most of the ex-
isting papers on Eurasian integration and on Russian foreign
policy contain four basic analytical ﬂaws. Firstly, hegemo-
ny is deﬁnedwithin foundational positivist traditions, where
the multifaceted concept of hegemony is reduced to polit-
ical, economic or military dominance. Secondly, the analysis
is based on existing theories of European integration, which
have been developed vis-à-vis European experience and
therefore don’t reﬂect Eurasian peculiarities. Thirdly, the role
of social forces in achieving hegemony is neglected, and
ﬁnally, these papers fail to consider competitive struggles
between capitals, neither vertical capital-labour relations
nor horizontal inter-capital rivalry (Apeldoorn, 2002).
The EAEU is an infant project, which puts limitations on
practical researchmethods andmakes it problematic to fully
base the analysis on foundational ontology. However, ex-
isting theoretical shortcomings and scarce empirical
evidence, which is reduced to the statistical data on the CU,
could be overcome by referring to absolute historicism,
which assumes a dialectical understanding of history, and
the relationship between economic and socio-cultural factors
when referring to Russian hegemony. Therefore, this article
applies the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony to the anal-
ysis of Eurasian integration. By placing the EAEU within a
particular historic moment, “with the possibility of the re-
currence of the old issues, which are perennial”, it is possible
to estimate its prospects for success (Morton, 2007, p. 30).
Section 1, which is fully devoted to a literature review
and the theoretical aspects of the article, is followed by sec-
tions designed to reﬂect the practical application of the neo-
Gramscian understanding of hegemony, which is constituted
of four “essential parts” or elements: institutional design,
material capabilities (capitalist system, economics), secu-
rity invulnerability (geopolitics) and cultural leadership
(Linklater, 2005).
Section 2 considers the material aspects of Russian he-
gemony in three sequential subtopics. The ﬁrst implicitly
deﬁnes Russian capitalism as the formation of a historic re-
gional or global block that starts at the national level
(Morton, 2007, p. 132). The nature of capitalism predeter-
mines the conﬁguration and transformation of social forces
(Bieler, 2002; Gill, 2003), which is the starting point of the
analysis. The second subtopic refers to the institutional com-
position of the hegemonic project, which is a “part of the
dialectical complex of the ‘national’ and ‘international”
(Morton, 2007, p. 79) when hegemony “moves outward”
after it is “consolidated domestically” (Cox, 1983, pp.
170–172). The third subtopic considers economic issues
facing the EAEU to deﬁne the material potential and con-
straints of Eurasian integration.
Section 3 analyses the geopolitical challenges and ideo-
logical constraints facing the Russian hegemonic project, as
the effectiveness of the EAEU depends on whether its un-
derlying principles manage to extend beyond state policies
“right into the conscious shaping of the balance among social
forces within states and the emerging conﬁguration of his-
toric blocks” (Cox, 1987, pp. 214–125).
The main theoretical development of the article is to
present the concept of hegemony as an evolutionary process,
which passes through three phases: initial, transitional and
conclusive. This presentation allows us to estimate hege-
monic phases for each of the elements, which, combined
via SWOT-analysis, drive us to the article’s conclusion.
1. Theoretical aspects of Eurasian regionalism
1.1. The concept of hegemony and neo-imperialism in the
studies of Eurasian integration
The contemporary relevance of regionalism in Eurasia
is reﬂected by the large number of academic analyses on
the topic, but these tend to approach the issue from an ex-
ternal perspective, “outside-in”, neglecting to consider
attitudes within Russian, Kazakh and Belorussian society,
and the peculiarities of the region’s self-positioning with
regard to the rest of the world. Using the experience of the
EU, they proclaim theWestern democratic model as the best
alternative to existing regimes. The EAEU is seen as an
attempt by the Kremlin to develop a rival project to the EU’s
Eastern Partnership (Dreyer & Popescu, 2014). Interest-
ingly, in some interpretations post-Soviet regionalism is seen
in a new light. Roy Allison and Kathleen Collins argue post-
Soviet regionalism’s main objective is not to foster economic
cooperation between states, but to establish “mutual pro-
tection” for autocratic regimes or “insulate” some countries
from external democratic inﬂuences (Allison, 2008; Collins,
2009). Most often, Eurasian integration is analysed through
the prism of Russian foreign policy strategy, with notions
of empire and hegemony widely used to characterise it as
expansionist, post-imperialist and even “de-colonialist”
(Bugajski, 2004; Lucas, 2014; Van Herpen, 2014).
Many papers by Western academics undertake a purely
realist approach, deﬁning the EAEU as Russia’s neo-imperial
project. The notion of hegemony is ﬂattened to the overt
facets of power relations, such as territorial expansion and
direct political-military and economic domination. These
accounts suffer from Russo-phobia, suggesting that if Russia
has not progressed to liberal democracy, it is potentially dan-
gerous to Western countries, as antidemocratic regimes
instinctively have imperialistic ambitions (Brzezinski, 1994).
From this standpoint, the EAEU is seen as a manifestation
of the “post-imperial syndrome”, rooted in “annexationist
Pan-Russianism”, alongside pre-imperial Russian foreign
policy (Van Herpen, 2014, p. 56).
SomeWesternauthorswhohavemanagedtomovebeyond
a purely realist approach deny the characterisation of Russia
as “post-empire” or a “pre-imperial state”. For instance, Jeffrey
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Mankoff, synthesising neorealist with constructivist analyt-
ical frameworks, suggests that Eurasian regionalism is an
“inward focused” alternative to the “returning great powers”
for integrating with global space, with no ambition to over-
throw the existing internationalworld order byundermining
theWest. The aim of this integration is to conduct domestic
reforms, strengthen the region’s role in the global political
andeconomicarena, and “re-establishRussia as amajorglobal
player” (Mankoff, 2012, p. 21). The author agrees, however,
that neorealist thinking, with its power relations and secu-
rity issues, better explains the inconsistencyof Putin’spolitical
course, with “the twist” from cooperation with the West in
2001–2002 tomoreconfrontational behaviourduringhisnext
term rather than constructivist methods of political dis-
course and “identity coalitions” (51–52). Nevertheless, some
within the same neorealist tradition arrive at the opposite
conclusionregarding the inconsistentcourseofRussian foreign
policy. For them, Russia has never ceased to aspire to great-
power status, as it suffers from a “collective inferiority
complex” (Saivetz, 2012,p. 402). ElenaKropatcheva, aRussian-
speaking representative of a Western academic institution,
argues that Putin’s political course in the so-called near-
abroad has actually been “consistent in pursuing its main
realist interests: maximization of power and security….vis-
a-vis theWest”,which is constantly triggeredby theexclusion
of Russia from international decision-making (Kropatcheva,
2012, p. 33). This desire of Russia to dominate the Eurasian
region, however, is no longer backed by the state’s military
or economic capacity (Spechler & Spechler, 2013).
Some western authors analyse Eurasian integration
with reference to liberal theories (Connolly, 2014; Cooper,
2013;Dragneva&Wolczuk, 2013;Malle, 2013;Olcott, 2005).
From these perspectives, Eurasian regionalism is not a
product of Russian hegemonic ambitions but a “tendency for
states to form regional groupings” in order to receive pro-
tection from the negative impacts of globalisation by
institutionalising relationships (Dragneva &Wolczuk, 2013,
p. 1). Russian-led Eurasian integration aims at developing a
regime in which uncertainty, transaction costs and market
failureswill beminimised (Dragneva &Wolczuk, 2013). The
regional “hegemon”exists, not as a rival, but rather as a leader,
attracting neighbouring states into closer cooperation. The
regional hegemonexercises its powernot throughdirectmil-
itary or economic domination, but through the creation of
an international regime,which, if successful, lives its own life
and could even redeﬁne national interests (Keohane, 1984).
Within the remit of the liberal theoretical framework, the
neoinstitutional and neofunctionalmodels could be applied
for the study of the EAEU. A similar attempt was made by
RilkaDragnevaandKatarynaWolczuk in their analysis of costs
and beneﬁts that the Eurasian economic union would bring
to its member-states. Their approach, however, is not state-
centred, and includes a functional dimension of state-
society relations, where domestic interest groups and
representation matter. The authors suggest that the EAEU
cannot be viewed solely through the prism of Russia’s he-
gemonic ambition in the region, as such a narrow focus fails
to consider external “political, economic, administrative and
international challenges” or to capture the role of other
member states in the development of regional integration
projects (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013, p. 7).
As for Russian academia, most papers published on the
topic are purely descriptive and often “follow a similar
pattern of reasoning, represented by a number of stan-
dard assumptions” (Libman, 2012). They are also criticised
for being clogged by “ideological statements and declara-
tions”, which contaminate academic discourse with
“politically biased judgements” (Makarychev, 2013, p. 239).
As Alexander Libman puts it, overall, relevant Russian studies
have weak theoretical foundations and are often “full of de-
scriptive statistics, but almost never contain original research
(e.g. interviews, detailed case studies, or econometric anal-
ysis)” (239). He argues that such works contain four major
assumptions which are seldom debated as they are assumed
to be self-evident. Firstly, Eurasian integration is consid-
ered economically beneﬁcial to all parties. Secondly, lack
of political willpower is believed to be the reason for the
failure of previous integration initiatives in the region.
Thirdly, the assumption is that post-Soviet countries should
follow the same pattern as the EU. Lastly, the average “post-
Soviet paper” would suggest that political pressure from
Western countries impedes closer cooperation among Eur-
asian states (Libman, 2012).
Libman’s argument that Russian papers are more de-
scriptive than analytical is not quite true. Firstly, some papers
have a clear realist vision of world politics, viewing Eur-
asian integration as a neo-imperialist intention of the Russian
Federation (Shevtsova, 2009; Tsygankov, 2014; Trenin, 2011).
In most works published in the years following the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, the popular idea was that of
another “Great Game”, in which former Soviet states were
viewed as an arena for economic and strategic rivalry and
competition between the major geopolitical players. Post-
Soviet integration is considered “one of the aspects of
Russian foreign policy” which have changed under differ-
ent leaders’ visions of Russia’s national interests, representing
ﬁve different “schools of geopolitical thinking” with respect
to the future of post-Soviet regionalism: “expansionists,
civilisationists, stabilizers, geo-economists andWesternizers”
(Tsygankov, 2005). From this perspective, the EAEU is viewed
as a purely Russian geopolitical project, a “political plat-
form for economic integration”, aimed at re-establishing the
country’s position in the multipolar world “as a major
power” (Trenin, 2011, p. 155, cited in Saivetz, 2012, p. 406).
This, however, doesn’t mean that Russia has “acquired a taste
for hegemony to replace multilateralism” (Tsygankov, 2009,
p. 59, cited in Kropatcheva, 2012, p. 36). The EAEU project
is criticized for being very costly and weak in its concep-
tual dimension, which makes some authors doubt its
viability (Borodkin, 2011). For instance, Dmitri Trenin out-
lines the detrimental effects of Russia’s self-positioning in
opposition to Western civilisation, arguing that the con-
ception of Russia as a Eurasian state might be baseless
(Trenin, 2002). Secondly, when some Russian authors con-
sider the EAEU as potentially beneﬁcial for all parties, this
analysis has a strong liberal theoretical foundation, where
neo-institutionalism is combined with a neo-functional
theory of integration (Podberezkin, Borishpolets, &
Podberezkina, 2013). Regionalism is seen as a process par-
allel and rival to globalisation. It is suggested that the world
has entered a new phase of political and economic devel-
opment, where the main actors are not states but “Global
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regions” (Vasilieva & Lagutina, 2011, p. 167). Thus, the Eur-
asian region has acquired “global” features, with integration
as not only a linear interaction between the states but an
attempt to achieve a qualitatively new level of coopera-
tion (Tkachuk, 2014; Vasilieva & Lagutina, 2011). Thirdly,
Eurasian integration has been analysed using anti-
foundational and interpretivist accounts, according to which
Russian hegemony is a phenomena constructed within
society via political discourse (Makarychev, 2013). The for-
mation of a Eurasian identity takes a central place in the
“combination of discourses” between central authorities and
the Russian, Kazakh, and Belarussian peoples (239). In Russia,
Eurasianism is nothing but a “post-political” hegemonic dis-
course of the Kremlin, which “instrumentalises” conservative
ideas “in providing an ideological basis for its Eurasian Union
project and concomitant alienation from the West”,
legitimising its ideas as indisputably obvious (249). This con-
structivist approach to analysing the formation of the EAEU
in the wider context of Eurasian regionalism brings us closer
to the concept of hegemony, which will be adopted as the
baseline theoretical framework for this article .
1.2. Alternative deﬁnitions of hegemony
This section aims to demonstrate: 1. how the
conceptualisation of power and hegemony differs between
conventional and neo-Gramscian perspectives; 2. why the
neo-Gramscian perspective was chosen for the EAEU study;
3. how the adopted concept could be ampliﬁed for analyt-
ical purposes.
1. Central to the concept of hegemony is the notion of
power. Realism restricts power relations to its military and
strategic aspects, deﬁning hegemony as the dominant po-
sition which states acquire in the process of relative
distribution of powerwithin an anarchicworld system (Gilpin
& Gilpin, 2001; Waltz, 1979). Structural realism, along with
long-cycle and world-economy theories, is a historical-
structural approach, which sees hegemony as a product of
the discontinuous evolution of the world system, in which
the distribution of power has long-term variations (Gilpin &
Gilpin, 2001;Waltz, 1979).Within the concept of the balance
of power, the rise of a hegemon brings stability, while its
decline endangers the world order, andmay “ultimately lead
to war” (Gilpin & Gilpin, 2001; Konrad, 2012). Alterna-
tively, liberal institutionalism introduces the theory of
hegemonic stability, according to which hegemonic power
resides in institutional structures, governed by rational actors,
willing to sacriﬁce short-term beneﬁts to obtain long-term
goals. Unlike realism, liberalism suggests that it is in the
nature of like-minded liberal states to coexist peacefully, pur-
suing absolute, not relative gains. According to Robert
Keohane, a regional hegemon, if democratic by nature, is less
selﬁsh, open, and beneﬁcial for cooperation. He sees liberal
political institutions as capable of moving theworld to amore
paciﬁc state, by creating interdependence and shifting the
centre of power relations away from states. Therefore, the
existence of a hegemonic power is essential for maintain-
ing peace and the world order (Keohane, 1984; Nye, 2004).
The literature review shows that the EAEU is consid-
ered as a tool for a neo-imperial drive for Russian hegemony
in the post-Soviet space. However, the notions of imperi-
alismandhegemony,whichareused incharacterisingRussian
foreign policy in its Eurasian neighbourhood, rarely tran-
scend the realist or other foundational paradigms. Therefore,
this article undertakes the neo-Gramscian concept of he-
gemony,which stresses the historical role of the production
forces upon which hegemony is built as a product of social
interactions. This conceptual framework transcends con-
ventional approaches in three ways. Firstly, it is no longer
bound with the state-centric view of hegemony as the
outcome of the distribution of relative power among states.
Secondly, it challenges the orthodox tradition of deﬁning
power relations as purely rational. And ﬁnally, it intro-
duces three main components of Gramsci’s absolute
historicism into the concept of hegemony: 1. transience, ac-
cording towhich the formation of hegemony is a cumulative
process and thus could not be fully repeated; 2. historical
necessity, which presumes that the formation of hegemo-
ny is constrained by prevailing social structures; 3. the
dialectic nature of structure–agency relations, whichmakes
hegemony possible through the consent of social agency to
the main ideological structure (Morera, 1990). Therefore,
hegemony is not a simple blend of material power, ideol-
ogy and institutions (Keohane, 1984) but a reproductive
system, in which the superstructure of political and cul-
tural practicespredetermine socio-economic relations,where
the ideas of the ruling class become unchallenged norms,
a product of a class project.
2. There are two reasons, why the neo-Gramscian ap-
proach has been adopted as the baseline theory. First, the
main research question (how successful is the EAEU as a tool
of Russian regional hegemony?) implies the challenge of de-
ﬁning the notion of hegemony. As it was suggested, the neo-
Gramscian concept of hegemony allows capturing all the
facets of power relations, while alternative approaches rep-
resent fragmented conceptualisations of hegemonic power.
Importantly, the EAEU is the project of integration. However,
existing theories of integration, such as intergovernmentalsim,
neofunctionalism, or neoinstitutionalism (multilevel gover-
nance) could only partially be applied to our analysis for two
reasons: 1. They are rationalist and consider agents and their
identities as “constituted presocially”, which ontologically
contradicts the concept of hegemony we adopt (Apeldoorn,
Overbeek, & Ryner, 2003, p. 29); 2. They have been elabo-
rated vis-à-vis European experience and therefore don’t reﬂect
Eurasian peculiarities.
Second, the EAEU is an infant project, which makes it
problematic to base the analysis on foundational ontology
due to a lack of empirical evidence. Therefore, the best way
to analyse Eurasian integration is by referring to absolute
historicism, which presupposes the dialectical understand-
ing of the relationship between political, economic, and
socio-cultural factors when referring to Russian hegemo-
ny. Thus, the formation of the EAEU could be better analysed
within a particular historic moment, which implies deﬁn-
ing the phase of the country’s capitalist development.
Moreover, this approach lets us place our case study in the
wider context of the international world order, which is so
important in analysing integration.
3. According to Gramsci, the structure of production enters
into dialectical relationship with social forces and deter-
mines power relations through establishing the combination
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of the production forces: labour, land, capital and technol-
ogy (Cox, 1987). The model is like a “layer cake”, in which
production and world order are the bottom and top layers
respectively, which predetermine the middle, state policy
(Strange, 1997, p. 26). However, there are other structural el-
ements or forces that interact with social forces. For instance,
international ﬁnance is a force “derived from production”,
which can “achieve autonomy fromproduction” and “become
a power over production relations” (Cox, 1987, p. 267). Susan
Strange suggested that there were structures, other than pro-
duction, that enter in relation with social forces: ﬁnancial
structure, which deﬁnes social relations in the process of the
creation, and allocation of credit; knowledge structure, which
emerges in the process of accumulation and transmission of
information; security structure that affects different aspects
of human life: physical, political, economic (Strange, 1991,
pp. 35–37). One might disagree with Strange’s consider-
ation that neo-Gramsciamism reduces the other structures
to “derivatives from production” (35–37). In fact, the neo-
Gramscian understanding of hegemony is much broader and
constitutes four ‘essential parts’ (core elements): institu-
tional design, material capabilities (the capitalist system),
security invulnerability (geopolitics) and cultural leader-
ship (Linklater, 2005). Hegemony is not as a static notion but
an evolutionary process, which passes through three phases:
initial, transitional and conclusive, which depends on
‘internalisation and internationalisation’ of the hegemonic
project through the reproduction of the core elements within
various nations (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 74). At the initial stage
an element achieves hegemony at the national level, then it
enters the transitional phase by becoming a ‘transmission
belt’, through which hegemony is ‘materially grounded’ in
other states. The conclusive phase assumes that the element
is ready to constitute the ‘essential part’ of the ‘moment of
hegemony’ (Material capabilities – Institutions – Ideas) (Cox,
1981, p. 136). This presentation allows us to estimate the he-
gemonic phase for each of the elements, which, combined
via SWOT-analysis, drives us to the conclusion of the article.
2. Material aspects of hegemony
2.1. Deﬁning Russian capitalism
“Hegemonic systems within the state” are deﬁned by the
relation between the forces of production and political parties,
and by levels of social coercion (Gramsci, 1971, cited in
Morton, 2007, p. 69). Analysing Russian capitalism sets a
complex task of determining historically formed dialectics
between “vertical groups and horizontal stratiﬁcations”,
where the former represent the state apparatus and the latter
the social dimension of power relations (Gramsci, 1995, cited
in Morton, 2007, p. 90). These dialectics in Russian society
have had centrifugal tendencies, which led to concentra-
tion of ‘horizontal stratiﬁcations’ around the state power
vertical. Central factors in deﬁning the capitalism type are:
1) relationships among main social forces, speciﬁed by the
mode of production, and by the ‘property right regime’; 2)
rent ﬂows distribution, which determines the formation of
social institutions and ‘accumulated governance structures’
(Screpanti, 1999, p. 1). Considering these factors, Russian cap-
italism is deﬁned as a monopoly capitalism, with 1) highly
concentrated ownership and control over the modes of pro-
duction and 2) uneven distribution of capital rent. The biggest
monopolist in Russia is the state, which controls 73% of the
transport sector, 57% of shipping and airspacemachinery, 50%
of the gas industry, 49% of banking services, and 45% of the
oil sector, which altogether form half of Russia’s GDP
(Vedomosti, 2012). Russian monopoly capitalism is a hybrid
of ‘state corporatism’ and ‘enterprise corporatism’, as the re-
lations at the point of production vary from sector to sector.
For instance, state corporatism predominates in strategic in-
dustries, such as the military and energy sectors, where the
power of the state political elite rules over “both manage-
ment and labourwithout any effective counterweight through
parliamentary control or accountability” (Cox, 1987, p. 80).
The best example of enterprise corporatism is Russia’s steel
industry, where nine private monopolies, EvrazHolding,
NLMK, Severstal, Magnitogorsk Iron and SteelWorks, Mechel,
Metalloinvest, OMK, TMK Group, and Chelpipe, account for
80% of steel and iron production in the country (Stalevarim.ru,
2013). The relationship at the point of production in enter-
prise corporatism is “between corporate management and
state economic agencies” (Cox, 1987, p. 80).
Post-Soviet capitalist Russia developed in three phases:
1. Market liberalisation from 1991–1998, bringing the oli-
garchs into the political arena; 2. Reconstruction of vertical
power from 1998–2008, leading to the rise of ‘siloviki’ (mil-
itary power elites) and the middle class; 3. 2008–Present
(2014), fortiﬁcation of federal bureaucracy as the predom-
inant social force. The analysis of the transformation of social
class balances, as well as the formation of rent sources and
rent distribution, is vital to understanding why Eurasian in-
tegration obtained practical meaning just recently. There are
two factors that fuel integration: the necessity to respond
to capital accumulation and surplus value realisation and
the assertion of social consent through “geographic spread
of state functions” in the process of legitimising new in-
stitutions (Cocks, 1980, pp. 14–15). It would be informative
to analyse how these factors have been deployedwithin each
phase of Russian post-Soviet capitalist development.
Phase I (1991–1998) established a ‘structurally dis-
torted’ market economy, with capital accumulation driven
by full scale privatisation of over 200,000 state enter-
prises at a fraction of their actual value (Dzero, 2011, p. 13;
Yakovlev, 2014, p. 12) and huge disparity between domes-
tic and world market prices for consumer goods and raw
materials. State bureaucrats, new oligarchs and public
opinion failed to agree on basic renting rules. Frequently un-
lawful property redistribution, growing income disparities,
and the tragic ‘virtual economy’ of Ponzi schemes like MMM
threw Russian society into chaos. The failure of integra-
tion initiatives launched in the 90s can be attributed both
to the post-Soviet ‘identity vacuum’ and capital ﬂight out
of Russia, which reached $2 billion a month under Yeltsin
(Laruelle, 2009, cited in Dzero, 2011, p. 13). Thus, econom-
ic stagnation stripped a swindled population of trust for
liberal principles and any integration project at that time
of material and social support.
Phase II (1998–2008) began with the ‘cold shower’ of the
ﬁnancial crisis, which made state power elites reorder their
relationships with oligarchs, or ‘powerful insiders’ (Dzarasov
cited in Pirani, 2011, p. 499). Putin’s federal bureaucracy had
115K. Kirkham / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 111–128
the contradictory tasks of fostering economic growth to reach
social stability while counterbalancing the oligarchy with
‘siloviki’, representatives of security and law enforcement
agencies (Yakovlev, 2014, p. 10). The siloviki’s initial ac-
commodation of medium-sized business was replaced by
‘vertical power’ as federal bureaucracy superseded themiddle
classes as the regime’s foundation of political stability and
economic development (Yakovlev, 2014). Nevertheless, the
mutually deterrent balance between state power struc-
tures andbig business distinguishedRussian capitalism from
some other post-Soviet states, like Ukraine, in which un-
controllable oligarchic governance drove the country into
political turmoil. In themid-2000s, Russia began ‘moderni-
sation fromabove’withanewwaveof property redistribution
in strategic economic sectors, involving higher echelons of
the power elite. For instance, state control over oil produc-
tion grew from10% in 1998 to 45% in 2008; the consequence
of the destruction of the old rent sources by the 1998 crisis,
and the emergence of new sources of capital accumula-
tion, such as natural rent, due to the favourable economic
environment for core businesses in extraction industries.
The de facto nationalisation of giant corporations, such
as Yukos, was welcomed by a population who felt deceived
by privatisation. Importantly, Putin’s attempts to restore na-
tional consensus were quite successful. Firstly, he established
a collective unity among different social groups by “con-
structing national identity around unifying historical events
and ideas” (Dzero, 2011, p. 28). Secondly, his leadership was
presented as a natural continuation of Russian tradition,
drawing frequent parallels to other strong Russian leaders
like Peter the Great. Lastly, he constructed a new historic nar-
rative, resurrecting nostalgic aspects of the Soviet past from
Yeltsin’s rash expulsion of the ‘burdens of the Soviet Union”
(Khrushcheva, 2006, cited in Dzero, 2011, p. 41). Exploiting
disillusionment with liberal principles, associated with cor-
ruption and fraud, the pro-Putin intelligentsia began
constructing an “intersubjective form of moral conscious-
ness” for Russian citizens through mass media and cultural
organisations, the “material structure of ideology” (Gramsci,
1996, pp. 52–53,Q3§49, cited in Morton, 2007, p. 92). This
was a successful start to forming an internal social base for
a future protracted ‘counter-hegemonic initiative’ extend-
ing the ‘historical block’ into post-Soviet space. If in the 90s,
integrations initiatives were met with public scepticism as
a throwback to the Soviet regime, in the mid-2000s, closer
cooperationwith neighbouring countrieswith shared history,
language and business culture gathered public support.
Without broad enough support for a ‘passive revolution’, the
‘siloviki’ imposed ideological change from above using the
state’s media apparatus. Yet Russia was no longer “reduced
to a state of prostration and inertia”, subdued to the ruling
party and power elites (Garibaldi, 2004, p. 15).
Phase III (2008–Present) opened anewpage in thehistory
of Russian capitalism. The Global Financial Crisis revealed
controversies hiddenbehindPutin’s re-centralisation of state
power, “engendering it with a sense of legitimacy” (Dzero,
2011, p. 58). Public consent started to wane as the crisis in-
tensiﬁed the conﬂict between the political bureaucracy and
‘rent-seeking elitist groups’. The government needed ad-
ditional social commitment frombusinesses, as the quantity
of the natural rent assessable for distribution sharply de-
clined (Yakovlev, 2014, p. 11). Concurrently, the law
enforcementmachine, facing no political resistance, started
to effect decision-making among middle and low level bu-
reaucrats,whowere trying to extract asmuch rent aspossible
frommedium-size businesses. Therefore the ‘siloviki’, who
had helped to reduce criminal pressure on business at the
beginning of the 2000s, gradually became oppressive them-
selves. The situation was aggravated by the disappearance
of the favourable market conditions which earlier allevi-
ated the effect of the poor investment climate on business.
The crisis of 2008made the Russian authorities realise that
the ‘siloviki’ and centralised federal bureaucracy could no
longer constitute the regime’s social base, and that consol-
idation of the middle class and defence of the interests of
medium-sizebusinesseswasvital to secure economic growth
and social stability. It is important to outlinewhy theworking
class remains passive and is not directly involved in the class
struggle analysis of the Russian capitalist system: class con-
ﬂicts in Russia are covert, as the capitalist management
practices “rarely penetrate beyond the level of senior man-
agement” and don’t take the form of “direct confrontation
between capital and labour” (Clarke, 2008, cited in Pirani,
2011, p. 504). Therefore, a peculiar feature of Russian cap-
italism is that class conﬂicts remain “diffused through the
structure of management, appearing primarily in division
within the management apparatus” (Clarke, 2008, cited in
Pirani, 2011, p. 504)
2.2. Legal and institutional frameworks
The EAEU traces its origin to January 1995, when Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan signed their ﬁrst treaty to form a
Customs Union (CU), later joined by Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan. However, before the 2000s, there was little progress
towards Eurasian integration, despite “ultimately unsub-
stantial initiatives”, such as the Commonwealth of
Independent States (1991), the ﬁrst Customs Union, the Eur-
asian Economic Community – EurAzES (2000), which
resulted in “fatigue and scepticism” (Dragneva & Wolczuk,
2013, p. 2). The ineffectiveness of former Eurasian institu-
tions had three main causes. The ﬁrst is economic: physical
survival was themajor concern of nascent post-Soviet states,
as old economic ties were destroyed and new ones not yet
created. In the course of political disintegration, economic
integration seemed baseless. The second reason is geopo-
litical: in order to survive, some states proclaimed a
‘multivector’ foreign policy, backed by legal reforms and do-
mestic market liberalisation to improve the investment
climate. Stripped of any substantial ﬁnancial resources, these
countries sawWestern economies as future investors; there-
fore, Eurasian integration was not economically prioritised.
The last factor is social: there was no middle-class social
base representing small and medium size businesses to
anchor economic integration upon. Furthermore, socialist
ideology was discredited while neoliberalism lacked mass
support due to growing discontent with privatisation. All
these factors, aggravated by aftershocks of the 1998 crisis,
conﬁned integration initiatives to elite circles.
The institutional design of the EAEU demonstrates con-
tinuity with its predecessors. However, Eurasian integration
has experienced two drastic transformations. The ﬁrst one
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was the creation of the Customs Union in 2007 on the basis
of EurAzES, which came into force in 2010 with the launch
of the common tariff, further developed in 2011 with the
elimination of internal physical border controls, and com-
pleted in 2012 with the inauguration of the single economic
space (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012, p. 6). The CU intro-
duced a “more effective legal and institutional framework”:
the most important institutions were the Court of Justice
and the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) in 2012
(Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013, p. 2). The Union’s institu-
tional framework managed to address four main problems.
First, the Intergovernmental Council started codiﬁcation of
a contradictory and fragmented net of bilateral agree-
ments into a constitutive uniﬁed legal regime, resulting in
the adoption of the simpler ECU Customs Code. Second, the
decisions of the EEC and other bodies were given ‘binding
legal status’ and described as directly applicable, which
meant that no special legislation or ratiﬁcation was needed
to make them effective domestically (Dragneva &Wolczuk,
2012, p. 7). Third, a dispute resolution mechanism was
created with the adoption of a new Statute of the EEC Court
in 2010, which made it possible for private parties to appeal
against the actions of their business counterparts as well
as decisions taken by ECU bodies. Fourth, in 2011 the legal
framework of the CU was supplemented with provisions
concerning Russian accession to the WTO, by the Treaty on
the Functioning of the CU in the Multilateral System, which
legally obliges the international agreement signed by the
CU to comply withWTO rules (Dragneva &Wolczuk, 2012).
The second institutional transformation of Eurasian in-
tegration was initiated with the 2011 decision to form the
Eurasian Union (the EAEU), which, unlike all previous re-
gional projects, demonstrated “certain signs of effective
supranationalism” (Kazharski, 2012, p. 1) andwas an attempt
to build an institutional design similar to that of the EU. It
was agreed that the introduction of the Common Econom-
ic Space in 2012, based on the norms and principles of the
WTO, and the creation of the EEC in the place of the former
ECU Commission, would be the following stages of Eur-
asian integration, with the EAEU being its ultimate objective.
In January 2015, new governing bodies will start function-
ing, replacing their EurAzES predecessors: the Parliamentary
Assembly will substitute the Interparliamentary Assem-
bly, the Eurasian Court – the Court of Justice, the High
Eurasian Council will ﬁll in for the Interstate Council, the
Eurasian Economic Commission will continue its work
(Galiakberov & Abdullin, 2014, pp. 4–5). The most radical
step in the expansion of EEC powers is the future ‘Eur-
asian Parliament’. Unlike the preceding CU Commission, the
EEC is empowered to negotiate and conclude internation-
al treaties on behalf of the ECU (later the EAEU), which could
potentially strengthen the Union’s position as an interna-
tional actor (Dragneva, 2013, p. 41 in Dragneva &Wolczuk,
2013). Another signiﬁcant change is related to decision-
making: whereas previously Russia’s dominant position was
guaranteed by the built-in majority of 57% in the system
of weighted votes, with Belarus and Kazakhstan each having
21.5% (Cooper, 2013, p. 21 in Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013),
the EEC departed from the system making it possible for
Russia to be outvoted, with each of the three members
having one vote. The ‘executive organ’ of the Commission,
the Collegium, is formed in the ‘EU-Style’ and comprises nine
members, 3 from each country, each with one vote, with
decisions taken either by consensus or a two-thirds
super-majority1 (Cooper, 2013, p. 54 in Dragneva &Wolczuk,
2013). This decision-making equality can be considered Rus-
sia’s step towards greater multilateralism.
2.3. Material aspects of hegemony: economic aspects:
technology, ﬁnance and trade
The failed CIS–model of Eurasian integration demon-
strates that successful integration cannot be attained by
political will alone, as it requires an “adequate level of eco-
nomic development” and public support (Galiakberov &
Abdullin, 2014, p. 2). Although the Gramscian understand-
ing of hegemony is an “essentially ethico-political concept”
that “lacks a detailed economic analysis”, the importance of
material power should not be neglected (Konrad, 2012, p. 3).
Gramsci saw hegemony as rooted “in the decisive nucleus
of economic activity’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 161, cited in Konrad).
It is worth remembering that the Soviet Union was a
common market long before the EU, and that the econo-
mies of the various participants in the USSR grew and
developed as part of that wider economy, which is why the
Russian government stresses that the goal of the EAEU is
primarily to give additional substance to the members’ eco-
nomic bases. Most recent papers on Eurasian integration are
highly sceptical of the economic rationale behind the EAEU
(Frear, 2013; Hartwell, 2013; Shepotylo, Tarr, 2012;
Kassenova, 2013). There are three main criticisms: the EAEU
suffers from insuﬃcient ﬁnancial funds, structural homo-
geneity, and dimension asymmetry among its members. The
objective of this section is to address Eurasian scepticism
and evaluate the economic potential of the EAEU.
Problem N1. Structural homogeneity
The ﬁrst problem outlined by academia lies in the struc-
tural homogeneity of the Russian and Kazakh economies,
which results in weak economic activity among member
states. Both economies are highly dependent on resource-
based output, which reaches 11% of GDP in Russia, and 15.5%
in Kazakhstan, comprising 66% and 63% of exports respec-
tively. Importantly, the economy of Belarus is also highly
dependent on the oil and gas sector: oil processing ac-
counts for more than half of Belorussian manufacturing
output and 33% of the country’s exports (Figs. 1 and 2).
The share of trade between the CU members in their
overall trade turnover remains very low, 6.5% in 2014. In
2014, internal CU trade declined by 11% compared to 2013,
from $64.1 bn. to $57.5 bn. Notably, hydrocarbons and oil
products forma large shareof internal CU trade (26% in2015).
The value of this trade is volatile and ﬂuctuates with global
oil prices, and production volumes are also variable, for
examplewhen large oilﬁelds are shut for repair, or as a result
of the reduction in Russian crude volumes processed in
Belarus (which was the case in 2012). In 2013–2014, the
decline of CU’s internal trade turnover was mainly caused
by the 9.5% reduction in oil price, the main export for both
1 Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Commission, 18 November 2011.
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Russia and Kazakhstan, from $107.9/bbl (Urals) in 2013 to
97.6/bbl in 2014. Furthermore, both the Russian Rouble and
Kazakh Tenge suffered large devaluations in 2014.
Similar economies and technological retardation make
it diﬃcult for internal trade to be the engine of integra-
tion and also increase the risk of Russia and Kazakhstan
becoming more synchronised in boom-bust cycles once in-
tegration proceeds (Hartwell, 2013, p. 413). Therefore,
diversiﬁcation of these economies is essential to receive the
beneﬁts of integration. However, one positive fact is that
value added products comprise a larger share of internal
trade between CU members than external CU trade with
third parties. For instance, machinery comprises 3% of CU
trade with third parties, and 20% in interstate trade, chemi-
cals comprise 5% and 10% respectively (Sokov, 2014). Critics
argue that this results from the low competitiveness of Eur-
asian products and the ‘tariff umbrella’,2 which helped Russia
oust ‘better’ and ‘cheaper’ European products from local
markets (Tarr, 2012, 2). That was not always true: in some
cases, when aWestern product’s market price was cheaper,
its maintenance was much more expensive than that of its
Russian analogy (Sokov, 2014).
However, structural homogeneity could become one of
the driving forces of integration, as it sets common tech-
nological targets. Soviet inheritance of the common electric
power infrastructure, transport and communication net-
works, and same research and development systems could
foster technological cooperation in the “nature of reinte-
gration” (Cooper, 2013, p. 22 in Dragneva &Wolczuk, 2013).
This is already true for the nuclear energy sector: most of
the uranium, mined in Kazakhstan by state-owned
Kazatomprom is enriched in Russia by Rosatom, which plans
to increase the nuclear share of the Russian energy balance
from the 16% currently to 25% by 2020, lifting uranium con-
sumption to 18 thousand tonnes annually (EEC, 2014). There
is also close cooperation between Russian and Belorus-
sian monopolists in automobile engineering, and the
manufacture of diesel engines and tractors. Russia and Ka-
zakhstan developed joint projects in helicopter and railway
car engineering, and pharmaceuticals, Russia and Belarus
– in military equipment and radio-electronics, Belarus and
Kazakhstan – in rail tank-car construction (EEC, 2013). In
fact, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus have adopted inde-
pendent programmes for modernisation (see Appendix A),
which, when compared, have considerable potential for
mergers (Tkachuk, 2014, pp. 54–55).
Problem N2. Economic asymmetry
Existing theoretical frameworks for analysing integra-
tion skewness in the EU demonstrate a strong link between
the “split in an asymmetric development of positive and neg-
ative integration” to the current crisis in the Eurozone
(Hacker, 2013; Scharpf, 2010). The initial economic asym-
metries in the size of economies, in the share of the block’s
internal and external trade turnover, in gains from exter-
nal tariff structure, and in divergences between the common
monetary and separate ﬁscal regimes – all led to asym-
metrical supranational governance, which “cannot be
corrected through political action at the European level”
(Apeldoorn, 2007; Scharpf, 2010, p. 211). Furthermore, the
dis-symmetries in the neoliberal socio-economic restruc-
turing in some states, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal,
“made the economic structure increasingly incompatible
with further social developments” (Rodrigues & Reiss, 2012).
The second ﬂaw of the CU and the future EAEU is the
asymmetry in the size of the economies of its member states.
Russia accounts for more than 80% of the Union’s GDP, while
Belarus for only 3%. This disparity increases the vulnerabil-
ity of Kazakhstan and Belarus to weakness in the Russian
economy: negative spill-over effects could worsen as the
economies become more integrated (Cooper, 2013, p. 22 in
2 For some goods in Kazakhstan, the common external tariff was higher
than the previously existing one. This formed the ‘tariff umbrella’, which
helped Russian products substitute their European analogies.
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Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013). The GDP of the new EAEU
members, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan3 is considerably smaller
than that of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, therefore the
initial economic effect of their integrationwill not be sizeable
(Fig. 3).
Another signiﬁcant asymmetry is the share of trade
with CU members in the country’s total trade turnover.
The CU accounts for more than 50% of Belarus’s foreign
trade, but only 18% and 7.5% of Kazakhstan’s and Russia’s
respectively (The EEC, 2013). Trade statistics demonstrate
that the relative size of Russia in the CU is increasing,
while “trade between Kazakhstan and Belarus is still min-
iscule”: Only 1.5% of Belarus’s imports are from Kazakhstan,
accounting for just 0.1% of total Kazakh exports (Hartwell,
2013, p. 413). Starting in 2004, the EU, not Russia, is Ka-
zakhstan’s main trading partner (Kassenova, 2013, p. 143
in Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2013). In 2014, the EU accounted
for around 53% of Kazakhstan’s total trade turnover against
Russia’s 19%.
Further asymmetry stems from the unequal distribu-
tion of gains from integration among the member states.
In the earlier stages of integration, Russia was accused of
beneﬁting from the “tariff umbrella”: common external tariffs
in most cases harmonised with Russian tariffs, which were
much higher than Kazakh ones, making Kazakhstan almost
double its tariffs in the ﬁrst years of the CU’s existence (Tarr,
2012, p. 3). The tariff rises led to ‘trade diversion’ by dis-
placing imports of equipment andmaterial from Europewith
imports from Russia, and implied a signiﬁcant transfer of
income from Kazakhstan to Russia. (Kassenova, 2013, p. 152
in Dragneva &Wolczuk, 2013). Another problem relates to
Russia’s accession to the WTO in 2012: Belarus and Ka-
zakhstan were expected to open their markets to cheaper
imports from WTO members, while not receiving lower
customs rates in return (Frear, 2013, p. 127 in Dragneva &
Wolczuk, 2013). However, with the EAEU agreements
coming into force, the negative impact of ‘trade diversion’
will be mitigated, as progress in reducing non-tariff
3 At the time ofwriting, 1Q 2015, Kyrgyzstan’s accession treaty has not been
ratiﬁed yet. Armenia’s accession treaty came into force on 2 January 2015.
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barriers will outbalance the negative impact of the ‘tariff
umbrella’ for the Kazakh market. Moreover, it is esti-
mated that Russia’sWTO accessionwill lead to the reduction
of the CU’s external tariffs by about 50%: after all commit-
ments are implemented, the weighted average tariff will fall
from 13% to 5.8% (Shepotylo & Tarr, 2012, p. 21).
Theasymmetries in thebeneﬁts fromtheoil andgas sector
will persist until at least 2020 (The EAEU agreement). Reg-
ulation of CUoil export tariffs remains outside the EAEU legal
framework: Kazakh oil exporters pay higher Russian transit
tariffs than domestic companies, and they don’t have equal
access to the Russian gas pipeline network, being forced to
sell gas at the border (Kassenova, 2013, p. 153 in Dragneva
&Wolczuk, 2013). However, the costs to the Russian oil and
gas sector from integration exceed its beneﬁts: in 2013 the
price of Russian gas exported toBelaruswas $173/tm3,which
was cheaper than the average price of gas exported to Europe
($422/tm3). Initially, theRussianbudget failed to receivealmost
$9.5 bn. from oil and gas exports to Belarus, but later re-
ceived compensationof $3.8 bn. fromoil processed for export
inBelarus. ThereforeRussiannetoil andgas transfer toBelarus
totalled $5.7 bn. (Vedomosti, 2014).
Problem N3. How to ﬁnance economic nationalism?
The EAEU’s third problem stems from the inconsistency
of its ﬁnancial systemwith its production development plans.
About 60% of global trade ($20 tn.) comprises trade in in-
termediate goods and services (UNCTAD, 2013). This signiﬁes
the importance of the participation of EAEU businesses in
international production chains,whilst avoidingmassive proﬁt
transfers from the EAEU to stronger economies and global
TNCs. The economically beneﬁcial integration of Russia, Ka-
zakhstan Belarus plus Kyrgyzstan and Armenia in global
production chains could only be achieved by their techno-
logical advancement, as the proportion of the value added
goods in Russian production and export structures demon-
strates that Russian manufacturing industries are
uncompetitive globally. This makes Russian capitalism refer
to economic nationalism and regional integration to foster
reindustrialisation. From the standpoint of uneven develop-
ment of world capitalism, Eurasian integration is Russia’s
reaction “against intrusion from advanced nations” (Cocks,
1980, p. 22). Like the ‘delayed industrialisation’ of the nine-
teenth century (21), the recurrence of economic nationalism
as an ideological force in Russian politics is dictated by the
need to lift the competitiveness of local industries in global
markets. Modifying Cocks’s deﬁnition, we could character-
ise the stage of capitalist development in the EAEU countries
as ‘delayed reindustrialisation’.
How to ﬁnance reindustrialisation and integration?
Russian state capitalism has limited access to foreign capital,
which keeps local banks capitalisation at low levels and
makes them “strongly dependent on relations with indi-
vidual oligarchs and the government” (Fifka & Robizhan,
2014, p. 3). In the past decade, the Russian banking sector
has experienced consolidation, and fallen under supervi-
sion by the federal government. This policy aimed at
‘clearing’ the banking system of its weak players, however,
is considered a positive trend by market experts, as further
consolidation of the sector in 2014–2016 could raise its com-
petitiveness and help to accumulate signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
resources for the realisation of long-term projects, includ-
ing industry modernisation. At present, the share of foreign
banks credits in Russia’s overall capital investments is very
low, at only 1%, while 46% of CAPEX is ﬁnanced by corpo-
rations’ own means. Among CU members, Kazakhstan has
the largest exposure to foreign banks in ﬁnancing capital
assets at 20%, but the federal budget share remains high at
17%. The overall CAPEX dynamic in 2005–2013 was posi-
tive for all CU members (Figs. 4 and 5).
Despite the low dependency on foreign credits to ﬁnance
current projects, ﬁnancing the development of new proj-
ects internally is still problematic. Limited access to foreign
credit sets a diﬃcult task for the governments of the EAEU
in ﬁnding internal sources to ﬁnance integration. The main
problem the Russian and Kazakh economies face is the
outﬂow of capital, challenging Russia’s hegemonic project.
For instance, in Russia between 1994 and 2010, the net
capital outﬂow totalled $382.2 bn., reaching its peak of
$129.9 bn. in 2008 (Pirani, 2011, p. 501). Aware of the
problem, Russian regulatory authorities initiated “power
pressure” on business in the form of “stronger persecu-
tion of entrepreneurs for tax evasion and use of offshore
networks” (Yakovlev, 2014, p. 18).
3. Moving beyond political economy
3.1. Geopolitical challenges
As it was argued in Section 2.1, Eurasian integration was
triggered by Russia’s disillusionmentwith the neoliberal rules
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of the game: the attempt in the 1990s to transform Russian
society according to democratic principles and open up its
markets did not bring positive results, as the country was
neither institutionally nor economically ready for instant
liberalisation. Moreover, Russia was treated with suspicion
by the West, which proceeded with its institutional devel-
opment against rather than with Russia. The institutional
expansion, from which Russia was de facto excluded, had
three dimensions: a) political-economic (the IMF and the
World Bank), b) military (NATO’s operational activities), c)
spatial (EU imperialism and NATO’s physical border expan-
sion). This de facto exclusion of Russia frompolitical, economic
and military developments in Europe left the country with
no alternative other than integration project with the post-
Soviet states.
In the 2000s, dissatisﬁed with the Western institu-
tional expansion, the Putin and Medvedev presidencies
reassessed Russian geopolitical strategy, deﬁning the cou-
ntry’s economic, social and territorial integrity and the
restoration of its regional leadership as its principal targets.
Russian state capitalism, if put in the wider context of the
international world order, was used as protection from “uni-
versal projection of mass production” (Morton, 2007, p. 100),
by combining “West-oriented liberalism and tradition-
oriented nationalism” (Beom-Shik, 2009, p. 9). The
accusation of a ‘resurgent’ Russia being “unsure about its
global role” (Rabst, 2011, p. 32) torn between its Euro-
Atlantic ties and its neo-imperial future is untrue. Russian
authorities express a clear vision of the existing world order
as multipolar, ‘threatened’ by US unilateralism (Beom-Shik,
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2009, p. 9). Ideologically, Russia’s elite has a strong realist
perception of the current world order as anarchic, with the
increased “geopolitical struggle for control over resources”
(Yakovlev, 2014, p. 13). From this standpoint the siloviki
think-tank, the ‘Izborskiy Club’ developed a ‘mobilisation
scenario’ for the country’s future development: enhance-
ment of Russia’s military might, state control over strategic
sectors of the economy, and reindustrialisation (Yakovlev,
2014). The Kremlin’s oﬃcial documents support this view:
the Foreign Policy Concept (2008) characterised geopolit-
ical unipolarity, “US economic and military dominance”,
and the declining signiﬁcance of the UN, as major threats
to Russian national interests (Foreign Policy Concept of
Russian Federation, 2008). Interestingly, this overt anti-
American discourse took a more hidden form in the
amended Foreign Policy Concept (2013): the main threat
to national security is seen in the structural imbalances of
the world economy and in intense global competition over
natural, ﬁnancial, and economic resources (MID.ru, 2013).
This change in deﬁnitions after the 2008 crisis is attrib-
uted to the acknowledgement by the Russian authorities
of the existing weaknesses of US hegemony, which signi-
ﬁed new possibilities for Russia to strengthen world
multipolarity (National Security Strategy, 2020, Kremlin.ru,
2008). Putin borrowed President Nazarbayev’s (Nazarbayev,
1994) vision of Eurasian integration as a “model of a pow-
erful, supranational association capable of becoming one
of the poles of the modern world” and a bridge “between
Europe and the dynamic Asia-Paciﬁc Region” (Putin, 2011,
cited in Golam, 2013, p. 162).
Not yet completed, the “bridge”, however, shows signs
of cracking, with the breaking point in Ukraine, the country
which is torn apart by two expansionist fronts: Russia, on
one side, and the EU and NATO, on the other. The crisis in
Ukraine with all the ensuing consequences (economic sanc-
tions against Russia)4 intensiﬁed geopolitical tensions in the
region, and could not only affect the EAEU, but also impose
a direct threat to Russian national security, an integral
concept, which includes social, economic, military, infor-
mational, ecological, internal and external political security
(National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, 2009).
As this concept depends on “the perception of threats, the
protected values, and themeans throughwhich these values
can be protected” (Buzan, 1983, cited in Nasu, 2011), the
civil war in Ukraine could make Russian authorities recon-
sider their “perception of threats” and elaborate a new, more
protectionist and anti-Western National Security Strategy.
It can also be argued that the ‘symbolic’ sanctions, intro-
duced by some states like Japan and Switzerland, compared
to the enthusiasm with which other nations, including Ar-
gentina, China and Brazil, are willing to beneﬁt from the
situation by intensifying their trade with Russia, disclosed
the long-standing geopolitical polarisation around two global
poles: the US and BRICs (Koktysh, 2014).
Economically, the situation in Ukraine challenges the
EAEU in two spheres: ﬁnance and trade. The realisation of
new economic projects in the EAEU is dependent on foreign
sources; therefore Russia’s restricted access to ﬁnancial
resources undermines its ﬁnancial stability and imposes a
signiﬁcant threat to the EAEU. Sanctions against Russia
have already urged the state oil company ‘Rosneft’, which
bears a debt of $54 bn. after the purchase of TNK-BP in
2013, to refer to the government for aid of $44 bn.
(Vedomosti, 2014). Statistics on foreign direct investment
(FDI) show that integration of the capital markets of the
EAEU is low: only in Belarus the share of the EAEU in the
total FDI is relatively high, 36.1%; while in Kazakhstan and
Russia it is 12% and 0.4% respectively (EEC, 2014). In 2013,
foreign investment into the Russian economy amounted
to $170 bn., or 7.7% of GDP, in Kazakhstan it reached $180
bn. (40%), and in Belarus $15 bn. (22.7%). Russia is the
main foreign investor in Belarus, 48% of total foreign in-
vestment. Kazakhstan, however, is highly dependent on
investment from the EU (41% of total), while Russia’s in-
vestment in Kazakhstan remains at the same level as China’s,
17.9% and 17% respectively (Rosstat, 2014). The share of
FDI in total foreign investment is 12% for Russia, 28% for
Kazakhstan, and 72% for Belarus (EEC, 2013).
The EU is the major partner of the CU, reaching 51.9%
of the block’s trade turnover in 2014 (China – 12.5%, US –
3.7%, Ukraine – 4.2%). Preliminary estimations by Europe-
an experts show that EU sanctions will cost Russia 23 bn.
Euros in 2014 (1.5% GDP) and 75 bn. Euros in 2015 (Topornin,
2014). Moreover, Russia and Kazakhstan are highly depen-
dent on the export of hydrocarbons to Europe. The security
of oil and gas transit via Ukraine will remain vital for the
Russian economy until at least 2016 for oil when some of
the 15 mm. tonnes transported via the southern branch of
the ‘Druzjba’ pipeline could be redirected into ESPO and BPS-
II, and into oil processing in Russia (Transneft.ru, 2012), and
2018 for gas, when the South Stream pipeline will achieve
its full capacity of 63 bn. m3/year (Gazprom.ru, 2014).
Fig. 6 shows that China is the second biggest trade partner
of the EAEU. The increasing geopolitical signiﬁcance of China
raises important issues. China’s military and economicmight
is expanding, and soon its economy “will overtake Ameri-
ca’s in size” (The Economist, 2014), bringing the EAEU the
following opportunities: increased demand for hydrocar-
bons and other natural resources; increased FDI in EAEU
economies and a counterweight to US geopolitical aspira-
tions in Eurasia. The reverse side of the coin could be: the
ﬂooding of EAEU markets with cheap Chinese goods, an in-
creased role for Chinese businesses in regional decision-
making and the ‘Chinesation’ of Russian and Kazakh regions
bordering with China. Illegal trade with China (The Times
of Central Asia, 2005), as well as narco-traﬃc via the per-
meable Kyrgyz borders (Kupatadze, 2014), make border
control strengthening one of the key priorities of the EAEU
security policy.
The problem of controlling the Southern borders is linked
to another geopolitical challenge, the formation of the
Islamic Caliphate (IS) in June 2014. The IS is a powerful
organisation, which controls a signiﬁcant part of Syria and
Iraq, and represents a common military and ideological
threat to both NATO and the Collective Security Treaty
4 The US and the EU sanctions against Russia include: 1. limited access
of Russian banks with state capital to the Western ﬁnancial markets; 2.
embargo on arms trade; 3. limitations on oil and gas technological coop-
eration. Russia responded by banning food and agricultural products from
the US and the EU, except baby food and alcohol.
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Organization (CSTO).5 This threat cannon be neglected, and
as Belarus president Lukashenkomentioned, the EAEUmust
develop its military cooperation on the base of CSTO to
address such external threats as terrorism and radical
Islamism (Lukashenko, 2014).
3.2. Moving beyond political economy: cultural leadership
Production, in its broader meaning, combines material
power with the “production and reproduction of knowl-
edge and of the social relations, morals and institutions
that are prerequisites to the production of physical goods”
(Cox, 1987, p. 39). The social factor is the cornerstone of
successful hegemony, capable of legitimising the norms
of the world order through social ‘consent and coercion’
(Cox, 1987). As was argued in Section 2, after the ﬁrst
social seeds of integration were planted in Russia, and
state functions were embedded within the national geo-
graphic borders, Russian state capitalism needed to spread
its authority across grater territorial areas. Social integra-
tion is vital to “legitimisation of the new institutions”
(Cocks, 1980, p. 14). The advancement of the Russian he-
gemonic project depends on how “reﬂexive and political’
Russian national identity is (Habermas, 1998 in March &
Olsen, 2009, p. 6), and on whether it has the capacity to
form a Eurasian identity.
Ideologically, the Russian hegemonic project is derived
from the geopolitical concept of Eurasianism. This is a modi-
ﬁed version of the philosophical discourse developed by the
“Russian pan-Eurasian nationalists” at the beginning of the
XX century, who were preoccupied with the threat of
“emerging regional identities”, such as pan-Americanism,
to the Eurasian common culture (Golam, 2013, p. 161).
Eurasianism should not be confused with the radical neo-
Eurasianism, which presents the West and Eurasia as
inherently rival civilisations and is primarily imperialistic
and anti-democratic (Dugin, 2002). Despite the fact the EAEU
is positioned as a project, competitive at some point to China,
the EU and the US, Eurasian ideology does not deny themain
advancements of Western civilisation: the “political freedom
provided by the separation of powers, the rule of law” (Lukin,
2014, pp. 52–57). The Eurasian understanding of individ-
ual freedom, however, differs from the neoliberal freedom
“from moral constrains”, aimed at acquiring “greater ma-
terial wealth”, as Eurasianism doesn’t consider the rights
of individuals to be “the sole purpose of life”, but rather one
among other ‘higher goals’, such as social prosperity, sta-
bility and harmony (Lukin, 2014). The question is whether
this just and democratic form of Eurasianism, oﬃcially
adopted by Russia’s power elites, could ﬁnd its practical ap-
plication and gain broader support among post-Soviet states.
The recent crisis in Ukraine suggests that Eurasianism as
an ideology is not strong enough to signiﬁcantly challenge
the neoliberal one in most of these states.
It seems natural to suppose that the common history of
the Soviet past should help re-establish a Eurasian identi-
ty. For a while, Russian, Kazakh and Belorussian societies
shared Soviet cultural values, which quite deeply pen-
etrated various spheres of life. Some of these residual ‘values’,
however, have a negative impact on the current political
systems of the post-Soviet states, resulting in bureaucrat-
ic inﬂexibility, non-market ways of doing business,
corruption andmonopolisation of strategic industries. There-
fore, in some situations, Russian businesses ﬁnd it easier
to deal with their Kazakh and Belarusian colleagues than
withWestern partners, because they exercise the same ‘way
of doing business’ and share the same values, which in most
cases signiﬁes the usage of personal connections to the po-
litical power elite. Have there been any positive democratic
developments in these societies in the last 20 years? Do
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus possess compatible capi-
talist systems, with the middle class forming the social base
5 Intergovernmental military alliance formed in 1992 by some CIS states.
Current members are Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia.
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for hegemony? In other words, can the Russian hege-
monic project be characterised as a class project? As
suggested in Section 2, in the late 2000s Russian authori-
ties took steps to consolidate the middle class, representing
small andmedium-size businesses, by protecting them from
the pressures of the ‘siloviki’. Among eﬃcient institu-
tional structureswas the Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI),
the practical result of which was the elimination of bu-
reaucratic barriers for business development (Yakovlev, 2014,
p. 13). Thesemeasures party helped to secure social consent,
which was further reinforced by a ‘heavy emphasis on pa-
triotism’, on extensive democratic values and the ‘re-
adoption of Soviet symbols’ (Dzero, 2011, p. 39).
Among all post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan has the most
similar capitalist system to that of Russia. In both states, the
rise of economic nationalism in the 2000s started with the
increase of direct (ownership) and indirect (changes in legal
and tax regime) state participation in the oil and gas sector
(Kalyuzhnova & Nygaard, 2008, p. 1829), which led to an
expansion of state capitalism. The formation of amiddle class
in Kazakhstan ran parallel to state power consolidation. As
in Russia, this process was hampered by a corrupt bureau-
cratic machine. However, compared to Russia, the Kazakh
middle class is more fractured due to the speciﬁcs of the
Kazakh economy, which is less diversiﬁed, and with an even
higher concentration of property rights in the President’s
clan structures. This makes it diﬃcult for Russian medium-
size businesses to interact directly with their Kazakh
colleagues, bypassing higher power echelons. Another dif-
ference between Russian and Kazakh social classes is that,
in Kazakhstan, the working class plays an active destabilising
role: in 2012–2013, the level of strikes in the mining and
metallurgical industries reached its peak, because in Ka-
zakhstan there is ‘no operating mechanism for the solution
of labour conﬂicts’ (Beissenova, Nurbekova, Zhanazarova,
Dzyurenich, & Turebayeva, 2012, p. 828).
In Belarus, a middle class exists, but it disposes no sig-
niﬁcant ﬁnancial resources or political will to challenge
existing state structures, which could be characterised as
a “unique example in Europe of a presidential regime
without an evident power or party political base other than
the president himself” (Marples, 2006, p. 355). However, this
regime hasmanaged to create ‘subaltern social groups’ which
have nothing but to ‘adapt to the activities and interests pro-
moted by the elites’ due to their lack of political autonomy
(Howson & Smith, 2008). Many in the West see the auto-
cratic presidency of Lukashenko as ‘artiﬁcial’, based on total
control over the mass media and political opposition (361).
Partially true, this point of view, however, is not shared by
the majority of the population of Belarus, which considers
closer integration with Russia to be economically beneﬁ-
cial, compared to the EU’s Association Agreement and
Eastern Partnership programme (EaP), as the EaP does not
consider integrating “the participating countries with the
EU any time soon” and is being used by the West to strip
Russia of its geopolitical allies, by imposing obligations
without giving anything in return (Zagorski, 2011, p. 60).
Nevertheless, despite its positive attitudes to the EAEU, the
Belorussian middle class is not empowered to become a
driving force for integration, as decision-making resides in
the hands of the president.
Another signiﬁcant obstacle to construct the Eurasian
identity lies in post-Soviet rhetoric, which reproaches Russia
for all the evils of the common Soviet past. Moscow is
blamed for the spread of communism and the formation
of a totalitarian regime. Since the dissolution of the USSR,
a new generation of people has been brought up on anti-
Soviet history textbooks, in which the collapse of the Soviet
Union was interpreted as liberation from communist Russia.
In some post-Soviet states, like Estonia and Ukraine, these
textbooks acquired a radical nationalistic form. This Russo-
phobia was intensiﬁed by an anti-Russian information war,
in which any attempts by the Russian government to build
closer connections with its neighbours were presented as
an attack on state sovereignty and Moscow’s willingness to
restore the Soviet past.
Conclusion
This article has pioneered in applying the neo-Gramscian
approach to analysing the potential for the EAEU as a Russian
counter-hegemonic initiative. The novelty of the presenta-
tion of hegemony as an evolutionary process, which passes
through initial, transitional and conclusive phases of its de-
velopment, along with the recentness of the EAEU as a topic,
could make this article a contribution to Eurasian integra-
tion studies. The estimation of the advancement of each
“essential part” of the hegemony in achieving its target –
the formation of a hegemonic block and the summary of
the most important determining factors and variables in the
SWOT-analysis (see Appendix B) bring us to the following
conclusions:
1. Institutions: transitional phase. The EAEU bodies were
modelled on the EU, and institutionalisation took some
features of supranationalism and multilateralism.
However, the ‘recreation’ of European experiences in
post-Soviet integration projects ‘looks problematic’: it
is possible to copy the institutional framework, but not
the content (Kazharski, 2012, p. 1). The term ‘institu-
tion’ refers not only to the organisation, but also to values
and “prevailing codiﬁed and non-codiﬁed norms of
behaviour” (Habermas, 1998, cited in Fifka & Robizhan,
2014, p. 2). In the future, the main distinction of the
EAEU from the EU might lie in the norms of state cap-
italism, which implies the perception of the world
market as the “ultimate determinant of development”,
which “does not posit any consensual regulation” re-
garding international trade and ﬁnance (Cox, 1987, pp.
290–291). This worldview might result in ineﬃciency
of existing legal mechanisms and consolidation of cap-
italist monopolies backed by authoritarian regimes,
concealed under a liberal veil, superﬁcially resembling
the EU. To avoid this institutional paralysis and to com-
plete the institutional formation, the EAEU members
should develop democratic practices alongside their in-
stitutional base.
2. Capitalist system: transitional phase. Kazakhstan
and Belarus exhibit monopoly capitalist formations,
through which Russian capitalism aims to reinforce
the competitiveness of Russian national and Eurasian
joint production projects in world markets. The
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creation of a competitive environment within the
common market is a secondary objective. The present
hegemonic project seems to prioritise big-scale mo-
nopolistic projects over general competitive businesses
development. However, if small and medium-size en-
terprises are not taken into account, monopoly capitalism
will fail to engender social consent for Eurasian
integration.
3. Economics: initial stage. So far the economic element
of Russian hegemony remains weak, due to the EAEU
member’s insuﬃcient economic diversiﬁcation, tech-
nological retardation, low internal trade turnover, and
limited access to external ﬁnancing, aggravated by the
economic sanctions imposed by theWest against Russia.
The realisation of new economic projects is highly de-
pendent on themembers own ﬁnancial resources, which
could only bemobilised by reducing capital outﬂows and
improving the investment climate. However, the EAEU
“weaknesses”, such as homogeneity, when combined
with the monopolistic nature of capitalism, could be
transformed into the hegemonic project’s driving force:
Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan can
merge their efforts to proceed with ‘reindustrialisation’,
to create transnational sectorial holdings and develop
joint technological and professional bases.
4. Geopolitics: in transition. After thirty years of might,
the neoliberal ideology has revealed its ﬂaws: econom-
ic and ﬁnancial liberalisation aggravated social
inequalities and resulted in the structural imbalances
of theworld economy.Military conﬂicts between social
classes and nations have intensiﬁed, making aggres-
sors out of the US-led hegemonic block. The ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008 symbolised the peak of tensions and ideo-
logicalweaknesses,whichcaused“powerfuldisintegrative
effects” within the neoliberal block (Cafruny & Ryner,
2007, p. 133). Here lies the explanation of the relevant
success of the present Eurasian integration compared
to its predecessors: the current geopolitical situation is
fertile ground for launching a ‘counter-hegemonic’ ini-
tiative, which acquires different forms, from peaceful
regional integration to radical religious socio-political
movements, such as ISIS.
5. Cultural leadership: approaching transition. Al-
though formed in Russia, the middle class has not been
yet consolidated as the social base for the hegemonic
project. The major ﬂaw of the existing capitalist soci-
eties in the EAEU states is the low eﬃciency of the
democratic power structures through which the forma-
tion of cultural leadership can take place. The argument
that ‘only a modern democratic state has the resources
to develop systems of mass persuasion’ is true in this
respect (Fontana, 2008). Moreover, the formation of a
Eurasian identity is in its initial stage. The EAEU au-
thorities should work hard on the construction of a
common identity by launching cultural projects to battle
Russo-phobia. The cultural domination could be possi-
ble if all the principles declared by Eurasian ideology are
practically observed and backed by democratic institu-
tions, created to fortify themiddle class as the social base
for the hegemonic project.
These conclusions, summarized in the SWOT analysis,
could have a practical implication for politicians, econo-
mists and other parties’ involved in Eurasian integration.
However, the lack of empirical evidence due to the EAEU’s
immaturity and obscurity as well as the absence of Kyr-
gyzstan’s and Armenia’s economic statistical data in the
economic analysis are the article’s weakest points. Soon after
the Eurasian Union is no longer a future perspective but an
existing reality, further research would be needed to esti-
mate opportunities and threats of the EAEU as the Russian
hegemonic project, more theoretical methods could be then
applied to widen the scientiﬁc narrative concerning this
topic.
Appendices
Appendix A. Sectors ‘prioritised’ for development
Belarus Kazakhstan Russia
Information and communication
technologies
Including transport Including space communication
Aviation and space industry Excluding aviation
Pharmaceutics Including other chemical industries Including medical equipment
Microbiology
Biotechnology
Electronics Including radio electronics
Nano-industry
Nuclear energy
Metallurgy
Defence
Shipbuilding
Petrochemicals Chemical and petrochemical cluster
Agriculture Including ﬁshing
Construction
Energy infrastructure
Sources: Tkachuk 2014 (Concept for long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation for the period till 2020, national strategy for sus-
tainable development of the Republic of Belarus for the period till 2020, strategic plan for development for Kazakhstan till 2020.
125K. Kirkham / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 111–128
Appendix B. SWOT
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats
Capitalist system
• Existence of politicised middle
class
• Class conﬂicts diffused through
the structure of management
• Resource accumulation
(monopolisation of strategic
sectors)
• Excess power of ‘siloviki’
• Administrative barriers for
eﬃcient competitive environment
for medium-size businesses
• Further consolidation and
politicisation of the middle class in
Russia
• “Business-centred
modernisation”
• Quick mobilisation of resources
due to high monopolisation of
strategic sectors
• Protection from “universal
projection of mass production”
(where required)
• Strengthening of power vertical;
‘siloviki’ as regime’s social base
• “Modernisation form above”
Institutions/Legal base
• Codiﬁed legal structure
• Dispute resolution mechanism
• Russia’s WTO membership
• Features of supranationalism
• Fair decision-making
mechanism (Equal voting)
• Incomplete law enforcement
mechanisms
• “State capitalist” nature of
institutional building
• Weakness of democratic
institutions (especially in Belarus)
• Strengthening of the EAEU
position as an international player
• Development of a greater
multilateralism
• Persistent ineﬃciency and non-
adaptability of legal mechanisms
• The formation of a unpliable,
anti-liberal, corrupted bureaucratic
machine
• Democratic development lagging
Economics (Technology/Finance/Trade)
• Structural homogeneity: Same
technological goals
• Common power, transport and
communication infrastructure
• Similar educational and research
system
• High concentration of ﬁnancial
resources (consolidation of
banking sector)
• Economic protectionism of
strategic industries
• Low dependence on foreign
credits to ﬁnance capital
expenditures
• Cheap labour/ Increased labour
migration
• Structural homogeneity/
Insuﬃcient diversiﬁcation: high
dependency on the single market
(the EU), and resource based
export structure
• Technological retardation
• Dimensional asymmetry
• Low level of internal trade in the
overall trade turnover
• Low capitalisation of banking
sector
• Low integration of capital
markets (FDI)
• Underdeveloped ﬁnancial sector
• Poor investment climate
• Declining population
• Structural homogeneity: joint
project development to compete in
the global market and increase
participation in global production
chains
• Mobilisation of ﬁnancial
resources due to their consolidated
structure
• Reindustrialisation: increased
share of value-added products in
trade with third-parties
• Creation of joint technological
base for cooperation
• Gradual trade liberalisation (in
line with WTO norms)
• Structural
homogeneity + dimensional
asymmetry: low intra-EAEU trade
potential for growth
• Vulnerability of Kazakhstan and
Belarus to the negative trends of
Russian economy
• Synchronised boom-bust cycles
• Increased proﬁt transfers to
global TNCs
• Insuﬃcient access to foreign
ﬁnancial resources to ﬁnance new
projects
• Outﬂow of capital
• World market instability/
ﬁnancial, economic crises, fall in
the oil price
Geopolitics
• Clear National Security Strategy
and National Security Concept
• Good relations with BRICs
partners and Turkey
• The EAEU enlargement: Armenia
to join by the end of the 2014,
Kyrgyzstan declared its intention
to join by 2015
• Favourable historical moment
(contradictions within the
neoliberal block)
• Strong realist perception of the
world order
• Mutual mistrust with the US
• Very low chance Ukraine will
join the EAEU
• The crisis in Ukraine
• Geographical proximity to
unstable regions (Afghanistan, Iran,
etc.)
• Poor border controls with China,
Afghanistan, and Tajikistan
• Transformation of the EAEU into
a supranational association – one
of the poles of the modern world
• Development of ‘multipolarity’
by further consolidation of BRICs
• Combination of “West-oriented
liberalism” with “tradition-
oriented nationalism”
• Improved relations with the EU
due to the weakening of the
neoliberal bloc: Europe’s hive-off
from the US
• Import substitution in some
sectors/ The usage of temporary
contra-sanctions against the EU,
the US to boost domestic
production
• US unilateralism
• Further exclusion from NATO’s
institutional expansion
• EU imperialism
• Escalation of tensions over
Ukraine/ further sanctions against
Russia: limited access to ﬁnancial
resources, problems with oil and
gas export/transit to Europe
• Adoption of a more anti-Western
National Security Strategy in
Russia
• Pressure on Kazakhstan, which is
vulnerable to foreign capital
• Increased dependence on the
Chinese political economy
• Spread of Islamic radicalism/
terrorism, narco-traﬃc and illegal
trade
Ideology/Social base
• Apparent attractiveness of
Eurasianism as an ideology
• Re-established Russian national
identity
• Mostly positive attitudes to the
EAEU in Belarus and Kazakhstan
• Scepticism concerning practical
application of Eurasianism
• The absence of a common
Eurasian identity
• Fractured ‘middle class’ in
Kazakhstan, reliance on personal
connections
• Artiﬁciality of social consent in
Belarus: autocratic presidency
• Anti-Russian rhetoric
(education/ Western mass media)
• Formation of the common
Eurasian information and
communication ﬁeld
• New common cultural and
educational projects (such as same
TV and theatre programmes)
• Formation of the social base for
integration/Construction of
common Eurasian identity
• Increased Russo-phobia and
anti-Russian propaganda
• Reinforcement of Soviet-type
ways of doing business and delays
in the development of democratic
institutions
• Failure to form a Eurasian
identity
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